From a Partnership of Convenience to Open Hostility: How Hassan Sheikh and Laftagareen Reached the South West Breaking Point
- Gallaydh News Desk
- Mar 17
- 7 min read
The political relationship between the South West administration and the Federal Government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appears to have crossed the line of dialogue and shifted into open confrontation. This situation brings an end to what Somali political insiders described not as a deep strategic alliance, but as a four-year "partnership of convenience" built on overlapping interests rather than genuine political trust.
What is currently unfolding in Baidoa is no longer merely an internal dispute over electoral procedures. It has transformed into a direct contest over elections, constitutional authority, succession, and the control of one of the country's most important and sensitive federal member states.
The Core of the Conflict: What Kind of Election for South West?
At the center of this rupture is a disagreement over the type of election South West should hold next. Hassan Sheikh’s administration wants South West included in the federal electoral roadmap and constitutional changes linked to the one-person-one-vote system—the same political direction that produced the local council elections held in Mogadishu at the end of 2025.
On the other hand, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen) reportedly prefers to hold a separate presidential election for South West, utilizing a regional procedure closer to the system seen in Jubbaland, rather than accepting a process organized and dictated from the center in Mogadishu.
This difference is not merely technical; it touches the very root of Somalia's federal system. The question is: do the federal member states still possess genuine power to manage their internal elections, or can Villa Somalia determine the political future of regional administrations under the pretext of "national reform"?
The Struggle Over Territory and Arms: 'Badbaado Koonfur Galbeed'
This political conflict has now morphed into armed confrontation on the ground. Insider reports from Somalia indicate that forces loyal to the South West administration and troops linked to federal ministers or opposition figures against Laftagareen are facing off within the state. One of these opposition forces is known in the political arena as the "South West Salvation Army" (Ciidanka Badbaadada Koonfur Galbeed).
The name itself is not new; Laftagareen publicly rejected the use of the "Badbaado Koonfur Galbeed" banner as far back as December 2022, indicating that this opposition movement has existed for some time, even if its military and political structure is currently evolving. What is new is the extent to which this standoff now looks like a genuine struggle for the control of territory and administrative institutions, rather than a routine rivalry between top elites.
Armed Clashes: Recent reports indicate that the confrontation has already turned into armed violence. The Somali Guardian reported that the rift between Hassan Sheikh and Laftagareen has escalated into armed clashes in the Bay region, with opposition forces regrouping in the Burhakaba district, and political tensions spreading beyond the city of Baidoa itself.
Similarly, Shabelle Media reported clashes in Baidoa on March 16, stating that heavy gunfire was heard in parts of the city, creating widespread fear among residents. These reports clearly indicate that the tension is no longer merely rhetorical. Baidoa has once again become the frontline in the battle for federal power in Somalia.
Flight Grounding: Laftagareen’s Show of Power
The latest phase of this standoff intensified following reports that the federal government attempted to block Laftagareen from returning to Baidoa while he was out of the country. Somali political reporting, including a widely circulated commentary published on Baidoa Online, stated that the federal government tried to halt his planned return, but Laftagareen nevertheless managed to fly back aboard a private aircraft.
This incident has not yet been independently verified by major international media, so it should be treated as strong political reporting rather than an indisputable fact. Even so, the political message embedded in it is unmistakable:
Containment: If Mogadishu attempted to block his movement, it demonstrates that the confrontation has moved beyond pressure and negotiation, turning into a direct attempt at containment.
Leverage: If Laftagareen returned despite this attempt, it shows that he still possesses enough leverage to defy the central government's orders and reassert his power in Baidoa.
The Collapse of the Partnership of Convenience
What makes this breakdown so surprising is that Laftagareen was, until recently, one of Hassan Sheikh's most trusted regional allies. That is why insiders do not describe the former relationship as one built on a genuinely shared political vision, but rather as a system of convenience that benefited both sides.
For a time, both men benefited from this alliance. Hassan Sheikh could use South West as evidence that not all federal member states had severed ties with Villa Somalia, while Laftagareen gained political cover and the opportunity to remain in office at a time when his administration's election schedule was delayed. But a relationship built on temporary expediency without deep alignment was always fragile the moment their interests clashed.
What Triggered the Breakdown?
The immediate spark that ignited this split appears to be Laftagareen's decision to withdraw his support from the federal government's constitutional amendment campaign and the planned local council elections in allied federal member states.
When he halted his support for that project, the disagreement transcended a minor policy dispute and turned into a direct challenge against Hassan Sheikh's broader attempt to reshape Somalia's political system. That is why the city of Baidoa is now so sensitive and politically more significant than South West State itself.
If Laftagareen resists Mogadishu's system and insists on his own regional election, he is not merely defending his office. He is sending a message that Hassan Sheikh's constitutional and electoral project no longer holds the support of even his closest presidential allies.
Villa Somalia’s Plan: Replacing Laftagareen
Political reporting also suggests that Villa Somalia is not only trying to pressure Laftagareen, but is already thinking about the aftermath. Several Somali media outlets report that the presidency is interested in alternative figures who could replace Laftagareen if he is ousted.
The names most frequently cited in recent political reports include:
Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur (Minister of Ports)
Hassan Hussein Mohamed "Hassan Eelay" (Minister of Livestock)
Hussein Sheikh Mohamud (Former Director of the Presidency)
Although these reports carry political weight, they must be treated with caution: they reflect insider accounts and elite maneuvering rather than official statements from the federal government. However, the mere exchange of these names indicates that succession planning is now part and parcel of the South West crisis.
Laftagareen’s Next Step and the Threat of the "Opposition Trio"
Laftagareen's own position is generally clear, even if its final form is still emerging. He appears intent on using his current regional power, security branches, and administrative institutional framework to secure his return to office under terms he can control.
On the other hand, Hassan Sheikh appears determined to prevent South West from being left in the hands of a regional leader who openly opposes the federal constitutional system and could join the broader resistance camp already occupied by:
Said Abdullahi Deni (Puntland)
Ahmed Mohamed Islam "Madobe" (Jubbaland)
Should this happen, South West would become the third major federal member state to slip out of Hassan Sheikh's grasp. This would significantly heighten the pressure on a federal government that is already facing constitutional, political, and electoral burdens.
The Djibouti Meeting and the Role of Foreign Allies
The impact of regional diplomacy has also exacerbated the crisis. On March 12, President Hassan Sheikh met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh in Djibouti for a trilateral summit publicly described as focusing on regional security and cooperation.
So far, there is no reliable official source confirming that the leaders specifically discussed withdrawing support for Laftagareen, and this claim should remain in the article as informed political speculation rather than a verified fact.
However, given that Ethiopia is the most influential foreign military actor in and around South West State, and since the relationship between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa has only recently begun to recover from the fallout of the Somaliland MoU crisis, it is unsurprising that Somali analysts and insiders are interpreting the timing of the Djibouti summit through the lens of the Baidoa standoff.
This external dimension holds special significance because South West is not just an ordinary member state. It sits on a highly sensitive security border, faces constant pressure from Al-Shabaab, and has a long history demonstrating the importance of the Ethiopian military. Within Somali politics, this makes Baidoa more than just a regional capital. It becomes the nexus connecting internal constitutional conflict with regional power struggles. That is one of the reasons the stakes are so high: any action taken against Laftagareen is not merely a local leadership battle, but a message demonstrating how ready Villa Somalia is to retake control of the federal map.
The Rise of Laftagareen and Constitutional Retribution
To understand why this matters, it is necessary to recall how Laftagareen came to power. His 2018 election in South West followed one of the most controversial regional elections in the history of Somalia's federal era, after the arrest and exclusion of Mukhtar Robow sparked an uprising, with the federal government being accused of heavy-handed interference.
That bitter legacy has never been erased. It is part of the reason why any dispute arising from a South West election is immediately viewed not as an isolated procedural issue, but as a struggle over who truly controls the administration: Baidoa, Mogadishu, or foreign actors holding weight in both. The irony of the current situation is profound. Laftagareen, once viewed as the product of federal government intervention (during the Farmajo era), is now evolving into one of the newest regional obstacles standing in the way of federal centralization.
Conclusion: The Federal System Faces a Severe Test
The messages currently coming from both sides seem to indicate not only anger but also exhaustion. The tone of the rhetoric shows that trust has collapsed, and the distance between Baidoa and Mogadishu is no longer being managed through genuine back-channel compromise, at least not visibly.
The space for mediation appears to be shrinking while armed posturing is increasing. This is what makes the crisis particularly dangerous. The most destabilizing political confrontations in Somalia often begin as constitutional disputes, and then transform into struggles over security command chains, territory, transport, and succession. South West now appears to be heading down that path.
Ultimately, the confrontation between Hassan Sheikh and Laftagareen is bigger than two men. It is about whether Somalia's ongoing constitutional experiment will strengthen sovereignty through negotiated federalism or weaken it through coercive centralization. Baidoa is rapidly becoming the arena where that question will undergo its toughest test. If the confrontation intensifies, South West will not merely be another regional dispute. It will become the verdict determining whether Somalia's federal system can still manage political conflict without slipping back into forceful subjugation.
