Somalia’s Expanding Defence Diplomacy
- A Gallaydh Editorial
- Feb 12
- 9 min read
Updated: Feb 13
Inside the Security Agreements Reshaping Mogadishu’s Regional and Global Alignments (2022–2026)
Introduction
Recently, MM Somali TV published a concise but striking report noting that Somalia’s Federal Government, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second term, had signed more than seventeen defence and security agreements with foreign states in just four years. That initial reporting raised an important question: what exactly do these agreements contain, who are Somalia’s partners, and what strategic logic binds them together?
This report was inspired by that initial observation, but goes significantly further. It maps each defence and security partnership individually, situates it within its political and regional context, and examines why Somalia has pursued such an aggressive diversification of military partnerships since 2022. Drawing on publicly reported dates, official statements, and regional security dynamics, this analysis seeks to explain not only what Somalia has signed, but why now, and to what end.
At the centre of this evolving security architecture are two overlapping realities. First is Somalia’s urgent need to rebuild its national forces as African Union missions draw down and militant threats persist. Second is a far more complex geopolitical contest unfolding across the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf, in which Somalia has become both a battleground and a bargaining space. In that contest, the unresolved status of Somaliland, Ethiopia’s search for sea access, Gulf rivalries, and great-power competition all intersect with Somalia’s defence diplomacy.
Qatar
Somalia’s most recent defence cooperation agreement with Qatar was signed in January 2026, during high-level engagements linked to Doha’s expanding role in maritime and security forums. The agreement focuses on military training, capacity development, institutional cooperation, and coordination between defence establishments. This deal followed earlier defence and security arrangements reached in February 2024 and June 2025, indicating a pattern of incremental deepening rather than a single, stand-alone pact.
Qatar’s interest in Somalia is shaped by a mix of counterterrorism priorities, regional influence, and Gulf competition. Doha has consistently positioned itself as a partner willing to fund training pipelines and support state institutions rather than pursue overt basing arrangements. For Mogadishu, Qatar offers both financial backing and diplomatic alignment at a time when Somalia seeks to avoid overreliance on any single Gulf actor. In the context of Somaliland, Qatar’s security engagement strengthens the Federal Government’s institutional capacity and indirectly reinforces Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims at a moment of heightened recognition pressure.
The gradual, multi-agreement approach by Qatar allows Somalia to secure continuous and tailored support without being tied to a highly visible or controversial long-term basing arrangement, which aligns with Mogadishu's preference for diversifying its partners. This financial and institutional backing is critical for the Federal Government to project authority and capacity as African Union forces withdraw, ensuring stability and a credible counterterrorism posture, which is a shared interest with the Gulf state.
Turkey
Turkey remains Somalia’s most consequential long-term defence partner. In February 2024, the two governments signed a ten-year defence and economic cooperation framework focused heavily on maritime security, naval reconstruction, and protection of Somalia’s extensive coastline. This agreement built on more than a decade of Turkish military training, infrastructure investment, and permanent presence in Mogadishu, elevating the partnership into a strategic maritime alliance.
Ankara’s motivations are multi-layered. Turkey seeks durable influence along the Horn of Africa, secure access to key shipping lanes, and a role in managing offshore resources. For Somalia, Turkey provides continuity, doctrine, and operational depth unmatched by any other partner. The agreement also carried clear political implications, arriving weeks after Ethiopia’s port understanding with Somaliland. By committing to secure Somalia’s entire coastline, Turkey implicitly reinforced Mogadishu’s claim over maritime areas administered by Somaliland, making this pact one of the most geopolitically significant in the recognition dispute.
The strategic maritime alliance formalised by the ten-year framework provides Somalia with a crucial diplomatic and operational asset: the ability to patrol and defend its vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the wake of regional maritime tensions, Turkey's commitment acts as a powerful deterrent, signaling international backing for Somalia's territorial integrity to both regional and non-regional actors. This commitment ensures that Somalia has a long-term partner dedicated to developing its naval capacity, moving beyond simple counter-piracy and towards comprehensive sovereign maritime defence.
Egypt
Somalia and Egypt intensified defence cooperation throughout 2024, culminating in a formal security alignment announced after presidential-level engagements in Cairo. The cooperation has included military coordination, training support, and Egyptian participation within African Union security frameworks. These steps were taken against the backdrop of rising regional tension involving Ethiopia, Red Sea security, and Nile Basin politics.
Egypt’s engagement with Somalia is primarily geopolitical. Cairo views Somalia as a strategic partner in counterbalancing Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and maintaining a status quo that resists unilateral territorial or maritime changes. Supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity also aligns with Egypt’s broader opposition to any precedent that could legitimise border revision through external recognition. For Somaliland, Egyptian backing of Mogadishu represents a significant diplomatic obstacle, particularly within Arab and African multilateral forums.
This alignment serves to cement a shared diplomatic front against perceived unilateral actions in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea. By engaging in security coordination and training, Egypt lends significant diplomatic weight to Mogadishu, leveraging its influence in bodies like the Arab League and the African Union to counter any challenges to Somalia’s sovereignty. This strategic partnership ensures that the question of Somalia’s territorial integrity remains a central, non-negotiable issue in regional high-level diplomatic circles, effectively complicating any external attempts to formalise the status of Somaliland without Mogadishu's consent.
Djibouti
In 2025, Somalia and Djibouti formalised defence cooperation through a framework governing the presence and operations of Djiboutian forces deployed in Somalia. The agreement clarified legal authorities, operational coordination, and troop responsibilities within regional stabilisation efforts, particularly as African Union missions entered a transitional phase.
Djibouti’s interest is rooted in proximity and self-preservation. Stability in Somalia directly affects Djibouti’s security, trade routes, and port economy. By formalising its military role under Mogadishu’s authority, Djibouti reinforces the Federal Government’s legitimacy while safeguarding its own borders. Although Djibouti has occasionally presented itself as a mediator in Somali disputes, its defence alignment with Mogadishu reinforces the international framing of Somalia as a single sovereign state, complicating Somaliland’s diplomatic narrative.
Saudi Arabia
Somalia and Saudi Arabia signed a security cooperation agreement in November 2023, followed by a second defence memorandum in February 2026, coinciding with major defence exhibitions in Riyadh. While full details remain limited, the agreements are widely understood to focus on counterterrorism, military coordination, and regional security cooperation.
Riyadh’s interest lies in protecting Red Sea shipping lanes, limiting rival influence, and maintaining stability along critical maritime corridors. Somalia offers strategic depth and diplomatic alignment in these efforts. The timing of the 2026 agreement, shortly after major recognition developments involving Somaliland, suggests Saudi Arabia was also signalling political support for Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims. Within the Arab League and Gulf frameworks, Saudi engagement strengthens Somalia’s hand while narrowing Somaliland’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre.
Pakistan
Somalia and Pakistan concluded a structured defence cooperation agreement in August 2025, described as a multi-year framework covering training, naval development, counter-piracy operations, and defence technical assistance. The agreement reportedly allows Somali officers access to Pakistani military institutions and supports the development of new maritime units.
Pakistan’s strategic interest is tied to expanding its military diplomacy along critical sea lanes and reinforcing partnerships with Muslim-majority states. The deal is also presents an opportunity and gateway for selling Pakistani military hardware to the region. The cooperation also aligns with broader Turkish-led security networks in the Horn of Africa. For Somalia, Pakistan offers professional military education and naval experience. For Somaliland, the maritime focus of the agreement indirectly strengthens Mogadishu’s claim to coastal jurisdiction.
Eritrea
Somalia’s security relationship with Eritrea has taken shape through political alignment and operational cooperation rather than a single published MoU. A key milestone was the October 2024 tripartite summit in Asmara, involving Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, which established coordinated positions on regional security and maritime sovereignty. Eritrea has been training thousands of Somali soldiers since around 2019, primarily through bilateral agreements between the two governments, with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visiting the troops as recently as 2024.
Asmara’s primary motivation is strategic containment of Ethiopia. By aligning with Somalia, Eritrea seeks to counter Addis Ababa’s push for sea access and regional dominance. For Mogadishu, Eritrea provides an alternative security partner in a volatile regional environment. The alignment directly targets the Ethiopia–Somaliland axis, making Eritrea’s involvement highly relevant to the recognition debate, even as the partnership remains tactically fragile.
United States
For over three decades, the United States has served as Somalia’s most enduring security partner, maintaining a persistent presence focused on regional stability and the containment of extremist groups such as al-Shabaab, ISIS, and al-Qaeda. While this cooperation was historically characterized by informal military support, it was significantly formalized in February 2024 under the Biden administration. This milestone was marked by a security pact and a memorandum of understanding aimed at constructing five military bases for the Somali National Army. By establishing a roadmap for force development and infrastructure, the agreement seeks to transition primary security responsibilities to the Somali government, though the long-term consistency of this strategy remains subject to the shifting foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration.
Beyond immediate counterterrorism goals, these renewed frameworks carry significant geopolitical weight by reinforcing the international legal status of the Federal Government in Mogadishu. Because U.S. military aid and training are channeled exclusively through the federal level, the partnership bolsters Mogadishu’s institutional credibility on the global stage.
Uganda
Uganda reaffirmed defence cooperation with Somalia through agreements and communiqués in 2024 and 2025, tied to training, operational coordination, and the transition away from long-term AU troop deployments. These arrangements aim to prevent security vacuums as Somalia assumes greater responsibility for its own defence.
Kampala’s interest combines counterterrorism with preserving influence earned through years of military presence. For Somalia, Uganda remains a critical operational partner. However, in early 2026, Uganda announced plans for a complete troop withdrawal, citing international funding shortfalls and shifting domestic priorities. This sudden pivot threatens to create a security vacuum, challenging the federal government’s credibility and potentially destabilizing the regional architecture previously anchored by Uganda’s long-term military presence.
Kenya
Somalia and Kenya finalised a bilateral defence cooperation framework in 2024, focusing on intelligence sharing, joint operations, and maritime security. The agreement builds on years of security coordination driven by shared threats along their border.
Kenya’s priority is domestic security and preventing cross-border militant activity. For Somalia, the agreement formalises cooperation beyond multilateral AU structures. Although Kenya maintains pragmatic ties with Somaliland, its defence partnership with Mogadishu reinforces Somalia’s sovereignty narrative at the institutional level.
Ethiopia
Somalia and Ethiopia signed a defence cooperation agreement in December 2023, renewing earlier arrangements. However, less than a month later the relationship deteriorated sharply after Ethiopia’s January 2024 understanding with Somaliland, which Mogadishu viewed as a direct challenge to its sovereignty.
Ethiopia’s overriding interest is access to the sea. Somalia’s response has been to internationalise its security diplomacy to counter that ambition. The collapse of trust between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu transformed Ethiopia from a defence partner into a strategic rival, with Somaliland at the centre of that rupture.
United Arab Emirates
Somalia and the UAE re-engaged on security cooperation in January 2023, including training support and financial assistance to Somali police units. The relationship later fractured amid accusations that Emirati regional activities undermined Somalia’s sovereignty, leading Mogadishu to suspend or cancel aspects of cooperation.
The UAE’s interest lies in maritime influence, port networks, and regional leverage. For Somalia, Emirati support proved politically costly once it intersected with Somaliland and Red Sea geopolitics. The breakdown illustrated Mogadishu’s willingness to sacrifice security assistance when sovereignty claims are perceived to be at risk.
Serbia
Somalia and Serbia signed security cooperation agreements in late 2024, followed by reinforcement of ties in 2025, focusing on police training and internal security. The partnership reflects Somalia’s effort to diversify beyond traditional Western and regional partners.
For Serbia, Somalia offers diplomatic expansion and a potential market for security expertise. It strengthens Somalia’s internal security institutions, indirectly supporting Mogadishu’s international standing.
Tanzania
Security cooperation between Somalia and Tanzania was formalised through engagements in 2024, culminating in agreements focused on training and institutional support. Tanzania’s approach has been low-profile but consistent.
Dar es Salaam’s interest is regional stability and solidarity within African security frameworks. For Somalia, Tanzanian training support contributes to long-term professionalisation.
Azerbaijan
Somalia and Azerbaijan expanded security cooperation in February 2025, covering military training, counterterrorism, and institutional development. Azerbaijan’s defence diplomacy increasingly blends security assistance with commercial outreach.
For Baku, Somalia represents both a political partner and a potential entry point into African defence markets. For Mogadishu, the partnership adds another diversified training and support channel.
Iraq
Somalia and Iraq signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement in May 2025, focusing on counterterrorism experience sharing and institutional strengthening. Iraq’s post-insurgency expertise is particularly relevant to Somalia’s security challenges.
Baghdad’s interest lies in regional solidarity and security cooperation within the Arab world. For Somalia, the agreement offers practical lessons from a comparable conflict environment.
Jordan
Jordan approved defence cooperation with Somalia in 2025, centred on training and professional development for Somali forces. Jordan’s security institutions have long served as regional training hubs.
Amman’s interest is stability and counter-extremism diplomacy. For Somalia, Jordan provides disciplined institutional training.
Conclusion
While the initial reporting by MM Somali TV highlighted the impressive scale of Somalia’s defense diplomacy, this aggressive expansion brings with it a high-stakes set of strategic risks. By 2026, Mogadishu has successfully created a "sovereignty shield" through numbers, but this creates a "doctrine paradox." Attempting to integrate the military traditions, equipment standards, and operational protocols of seventeen different nations, from Turkey’s maritime doctrine and U.S. counterterrorism tactics to Serbian police training, risks creating a fragmented military architecture rather than a unified national army. Without a centralized command-and-control system capable of harmonizing these competing influences, the Somali National Army could become a patchwork of units more loyal to their foreign trainers than to a single national command.
Furthermore, the potential fallout of this "promiscuous" diplomacy is already visible in the fracturing of regional stability. The heavy alignment with Egypt and Eritrea to counterbalance Ethiopia has effectively transformed defense pacts into tools of regional polarization, heightening the risk of a proxy conflict on Somali soil. Additionally, as seen with the sudden 2026 Ugandan withdrawal and previous frictions with the UAE, relying on a diverse array of partners makes Somalia vulnerable to the shifting domestic politics of foreign capitals. If Mogadishu cannot translate these disparate signatures into a cohesive, self-sustaining force before the final AU transition in October 2026, it risks a catastrophic security vacuum that no amount of diplomatic paperwork can fill.
